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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to provide a thorough study on the effectiveness
of the transformation-based ensemble defence for image classifica-
tion and its reasons. It has been empirically shown that they can
enhance the robustness against evasion attacks, while there is little
analysis on the reasons. In particular, it is not clear whether the
robustness improvement is a result of transformation or ensemble.
In this paper, we design two adaptive attacks to better evaluate the
transformation-based ensemble defence. We conduct experiments
to show that 1) the transferability of adversarial examples exists
among the models trained on data records after different reversible
transformations; 2) the robustness gained through transformation-
based ensemble is limited; 3) this limited robustness is mainly
from the irreversible transformations rather than the ensemble
of a number of models; and 4) blindly increasing the number of
sub-models in a transformation-based ensemble does not bring
extra robustness gain.
KEYWORDS
Adversarial Machine Learning, Evasion Attack, Ensemble, Trans-
ferability, Robustness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are widely deployed in various
domains. However, DNNs are shown to be intrinsically vulnerable
to Adversarial Examples (AEs) which are the input samples mali-
ciously crafted to mislead the victim DNN to an erroneous output.
This is also known as the evasion attack. There have been various
algorithms proposed to generate AEs [30][9][22][3]. In order to
maintain stealthy in the evasion attack, these algorithms usually
generate AEs bounded by certain distance measurements like 𝐿1, 𝐿2,
and 𝐿∞ norms to guarantee the generated AEs are similar to the
original input and imperceptible to human eyes [3].
It is important to defend against AEs so that we can trust DNNs
in critical applications, such as autonomous driving [14]. Since the
discovery of the evasion attack in 2013 [30], continuous efforts have
been put in defending DNNs against AEs [26][35]. However, the
adaptive attack [3][31], which is specifically designed to target a
∗This work was done during his internship at Huawei International, Singapore.
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given defence, leads the DNN evasion attack and defence into an
endless arms race.
Among various defence mechanisms, ensemble is one of the
major defence directions that attracts a wide range of attention.
Ensemble-based defence approaches aim at gaining adversarial
robustness by incorporating an ensemble of sub-models. Abbasi
and Gagné [1] are the first to defend evasion attacks using an
ensemble of specialists. Though their defence soon was broken by
He et al. [10], many follow up research works continue to improve
the ensemble technique [16][23][29][32][20].
The key point in an ensemble defence is the selection of the
ensemble sub-models. The majority of the ensembles encourage
their sub-models (aka, ensemble members) to be as diverse as
possible. This can be achieved by promoting the diversity among
sub-models [23], using mixed precision of weights and activation
functions [28], training an ensemble of binary-classifiers with suf-
ficient diversity and redundancy [32], etc. It is expected that the
AEs can only fool a minority of the diversified sub-models. In this
manner, when the ensemble aggregates the final decision using
various ensemble strategies, such as majority voting, it is more
possible for it to provide a correct output than that from just one
single model.
Recently, there is a novel way of constructing an ensemble
based on image transformations being proposed to enhance model
robustness [20]. Instead of explicitly promoting the diversity among
sub-models, this approach combines a pool of candidate sub-models
associated with a large variety of transformations. It is shown to
be robust against AEs generated by various attack algorithms even
when the attack has full knowledge of the ensemble including
the sub-models and the ensemble strategy. Since many ensemble
defence methods have been successfully attacked soon after its
proposal, it attracts our great interest to analyse where exactly the
robustness comes from in the transformation-based ensembles.
Bearing this question in mind, in this paper, we carry out empir-
ical experiments to analyse the robustness of the transformation-
based ensemble defence. We notice that there are two types of
transformations [20], i.e., reversible transformation and irreversible
transformation. We design separate experiments to evaluate the
ensemble defences based on the two types of transformations,
respectively.
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For the ensemble based on reversible transformations, i.e., the
ensemble whose sub-models are trained on the data being pre-
processed by reversible transformations, two adaptive attacks are
designed to better understand its robustness, i.e., Transferability-
based Adaptive Attack (TAA) and Perturbation Aggregation Attack
(PAA). TAA is inspired by Liebig’s law of the minimum in agri-
cultural science that the growth is dictated not by total resources
available, but by the scarcest resources [8]. Based on the trans-
ferability analysis, TAA enables us to identify the “scarcest” sub-
model, attacking which may compromise the overall prediction
of the ensemble. We also call it “weakest” sub-model from the
attacker’s point of view. Differently, PAA is to consider as much as
possible the characteristics of the sub-models instead of just one
“weakest” sub-model. PAA calculates the adversarial perturbation
for each sub-model and combines the perturbations using various
aggregation strategies to generate a practical AE bounded by a
designated dissimilarity score.
For ensemble based on irreversible transformations, i.e., the en-
semble whose sub-models are trained on the data after irreversible
transformations, we evaluate its robustness using transferability-
based attacks [20]. In such irreversible ensembles, it is difficult
to project the perturbation generated on sub-models back to the
original input due to the existence of the irreversible transformation.
Hence PAA, which aggregates individual perturbations, is not
applicable to irreversible ensembles. Moreover, in order to identify
the robustness source, we control the proportion of sub-models
based on reversible transformation and irreversible transformation
in a hybrid ensemble to measure the contribution from the two
types of transformations.We randomly draw a controlled number of
the irreversible sub-models, add them to the ensemble of reversible
sub-models that has been evaluated, and compare the robustness
fluctuation caused by the number of the newly added sub-models.
Our experiment results reveal that the transformation-based
ensemble indeed brings robustness to some extent, however, it
cannot bring the expected strong robustness as shown previously
in [20]. In addition, our results indicate that the gained robustness
by transformation-based ensemble is mainly from the irreversible
transformations instead of the ensemble of a number of sub-models.
Specifically, for ensemble based on reversible transformations, the
transferability of PGD-generated AEs among sub-models trained on
data after different transformation reaches 59.71% on average. As a
consequence, in TAA, the AEs generated by PGD against one single
sub-model can lower the classification accuracy of the ensemble
to 32.64% on average. PAA attack can compromise the accuracy
of the ensemble based on reversible transformations further. Even
optimisation-based attacks, which show little harm to the ensemble
in TAA, can successfully lower the accuracy of the ensemble to
around 70% using C&W as the base attack algorithm and 20% using
DeepFool as the base attack algorithm. For ensembles based on
irreversible transformations, taking the PGD attack as an example,
our results show that the ensemble accuracy, regardless of the used
ensemble strategy, is only around 50%, which is around 10% higher
than the ensemble based on reversible transformations. In addition,
the number of sub-models in an ensemble based on irreversible
transformations does not affect the robustness against AEs much.
In summary, we made the following contributions.
• We analyse the transferability of AEs among the models
trained on data after reversible transformations and evaluate
the ensemble based on such models using the proposed TAA.
The experiment results show that the transferability does
exist among the models performing the same classification
task, even when they are trained on the data that have been
pre-processed by different reversible transformations. And,
the ensemble with only such sub-models is vulnerable to
AEs generated against any of its sub-models regardless of
its overall ensemble strategy.
• Instead of targeting only one sub-model as in TAA, we
further propose an adaptive and bounded PAA by aggregat-
ing the adversarial perturbations generated against all the
ensemble sub-models using various aggregation strategies.
PAA adopts a dissimilarity score to bound the generated
adversarial perturbations, which helps to generate more
stealthy AEs. The experiment results show that ensemble
with only sub-models trained on data after reversible trans-
formation is vulnerable to PAA. Those base attack algorithms,
under which the reversible ensemble has shown strong ro-
bustness in TAA experiments, such as C&W and DeepFool,
also successfully compromise the ensemble accuracy largely
in PAA experiments.
• For the ensemble of sub-models trained on data after irre-
versible transformations, we evaluate its robustness using
transferability-based attacks [20]. We design experiments to
identify the contribution to the robustness from reversible
transformations and irreversible transformations, respect-
ively. The results indicate that 1) generally the transformation-
based ensemble can provide certain robustness but cannot
reach its debut robustness; 2) the gained robustness is from
the irreversible transformation instead of the ensemble of a
number of sub-models; 3) the number of sub-models is not
a key factor in gaining robustness, i.e., it cannot gain more
robustness by incorporating more such sub-models.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Evasion Attacks
A classification task can be represented as 𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓𝜃 (𝑥), where
a classifier 𝑓 with parameters 𝜃 takes input 𝑥 and outputs the
prediction 𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 for 𝑥 . In the evasion attack, an AE 𝑥∗ is an input
sample maliciously crafted to mislead the victim classifier to an
erroneous output 𝑦∗ = 𝑓𝜃 (𝑥∗). 𝑥∗ is close to 𝑥 with respect to
some distance measurement 𝑑𝐿𝑝 such as 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿∞ norms, that is
𝑑𝐿𝑝 (𝑥, 𝑥∗) < 𝜖 , so that the perturbation is imperceptible. If the
erroneous output 𝑦∗ is unspecified as long as 𝑦∗ ≠ 𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 , the attack
is named untargeted attack. We focus on untargeted attacks in this
paper, while the analysis can be easily extended to targeted attack.
The evasion attacks can be categorised into the black-box attack
and white-box attack. In the black-box attack, the attacker has
no knowledge of the internal information about the model. The
attacker can only perform legitimate operations such as querying
using her/his data and observing the model output. In the white-
box setting, the adversary knows all about the model, including
the model structure and parameter weights. There have been many
methods proposed for generating AEs in both black-box setting
and white-box setting.
We introduce four classical white-box AE generation methods
used in this paper, i.e., FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) [9], PGD
(Projected Gradient Descent) [17], C&W [3], and DeepFool [22].
FGSM [9] is a classical gradient-based attack. It updates the
adversarial perturbations by the gradient of adversary’s objective
with respect to the input in the following way.
𝑥∗ = 𝑥 + 𝜖 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇𝑥𝐿(𝑓𝜃 (𝑥), 𝑦))
where 𝐿 is the objective function for trained target classifier 𝑓𝜃 , 𝜖
is the perturbation budget.
PGD [17] is an iterative variant of FGSM. It is also a represent-
ative of various iterative methods, such as Basic Iterative Method
[13] and Momentum Iterative Method [7], due to its superior attack
effect [18]. PGD updates perturbation gradually till the perturbation
budget exceeded or the target model successfully fooled. During
every iteration, instead of taking a big step at the size of budget 𝜖 ,
PGD updates perturbations in a gentle way with step size 𝛼 < 𝜖 .
As pixel values for images are bounded, PGD projects generated
adversarial perturbations into the feasible domain before entering
the next iteration.
C&W [3] represents another type of generating methods that
treat the procedure of finding adversarial examples as an optim-
isation problem. Instead of solving an optimisation problem with
distance constraints, C&W attack applies the change of variable
method to ensure the generated AEs are in a feasible domain.
Also, to keep AEs stealthy and effective, a weighted sum of 𝐿𝑝
distance and attacker’s loss is included in the optimisation terms.
The 𝐿2 bounded C&W attack is to solve the following optimisation
problem.
𝑤 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤∗∈𝑅 | | 12 (tanh(𝑤
∗) +1) −𝑥 | |22 +𝑐 · 𝑓
(
1
2 (tanh(𝑤
∗) + 1)
)
where 𝑐 is a constant found by lattice search.
DeepFool [22] is another optimisation-based method but with a
closed form representation of minimum distance to the closest loc-
ally linear approximation of target classifier’s decision boundaries
as
𝑙 ← 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑘≠𝑘 (𝑥)
|𝑓 ′
𝑘
|
| |𝑤 ′
𝑘
| |2
where 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is one of all possible classes, 𝑥 is the original benign
example, and
𝑤 ′𝑘 ← ∇𝑓𝑘 (𝑥𝑖 ) − ∇𝑓𝑘 (𝑥) (𝑥𝑖 )
𝑓 ′𝑘 ← 𝑓𝑘 (𝑥𝑖 ) − 𝑓𝑘 (𝑥) (𝑥𝑖 )
DeepFool performs the above operations to update the current
generated AE 𝑥𝑖 at step 𝑖 iteratively till it successfully fools the
victim classifier.
2.2 Transferability
Experiments in previous research show that AEs generated by
attack algorithms targeting one specific model may successfully
fool other models [11][6]. This type of phenomenon is called trans-
ferability. Demontis et al. [6] proposed to represent transferability
Figure 1: Illustration of a Transformation-Based Ensemble.
numerically as the value of target classifier’s objective function
given the perturbed example and its ground truth label.
The transferable nature of AEs has been shown to be able to
assist attackers to fool a well-protected model by generating ad-
versarial examples on a surrogatemodel trainedwith only black-box
queries [24]. In an ensemble of many sub-models, it is expected
that the transferability of AEs among the sub-models should be
low. In this way, the ensemble can still make the correct decision
with a high probability since not all of the sub-models are fooled at
the same time. However, the transferability of AEs generated on
one sub-model may differ from that on another sub-model. Hence,
an attacker may be able to generate adversarial examples on one
ensemble member, i.e., the sub-model whose AEs are with high
transferability, and successfully transfer its AEs to other ensemble
members, eventually fooling the whole ensemble model.
2.3 Transformation-based Ensemble Defence
Empirical evidence has shown that adversarial examples are sens-
itive to image transformations caused by the camera when per-
forming attacks in the physical world [13]. Taking pictures of
successful adversarial images as input to the target classifiers, the
attack success rate drops from nearly 100% to almost zero. The
AE’s high sensitivity to image transformation is also used in the
detection of AE [35]. By comparing the softmax probability vectors
across the outputs of the classifier trained on the original data and
the classifier trained on the transformed data (i.e., colour-depth-
reduction and spatially pixel smoothing), it can detect the existence
of AE which is indicated by a high distance score.
A very recent work proposes a robust ensemble with sub-models
on 72 input transformations for image classification task [20]. As
shown in Figure 1, each sub-model is trained on the training data
that have been gone through one specific transformation. The
72 transformations are listed in Table 1. We categorise them into
reversible transformations and irreversible transformations.
In the inference phase, the ensemble takes an original image
𝑥 as input. For each sub-model 𝑓𝑡𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [0, 71], the original 𝑥 is
transformed by 𝑡𝑖 to 𝑥𝑡𝑖 before being processed by 𝑓𝑡𝑖 . The decisions
of all the sub-models, in the form of predicted probabilities or logits
from the last layer, can be aggregated using one of the 5 ensemble
strategies, i.e., Random Defence (RD), Majority Voting (MV), Top 2
Majority Voting (T2MV), Average Probability (AVEP) and Average
Logits (AVEL). RD outputs the prediction from a random sub-model.
MV determines the output label that is agreed upon by most sub-
models. T2MV performs MV among labels associated with the top
Table 1: Transformations List
Category Transformation Details
Reversible
Transformations
Shift (left, right, top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right)
Flip (horizontal, vertical, both)
Rotation (90°,180°,270°)
Irreversible
Transformations
Cartoonify (4 styles)
Affine (Compress / Stretch vertically and/or horizontally)
Denoise (nl means, nl means fast, tv menas, tv chambolle, wavelet)
Morphology (erosion, dilation, opening, closing, gradient)
Noise (gaussian, localvar, pepper, poison, salt, salt&pepper)
Augmentation (feature-wise / sample-wise std normalization)
Segmentation (color-based)
Quantization (4 clusters, 8 clusters)
Distortion (x-axis, y-axis)
Filter (entropy, gaussian, maximum, median, minimum, Prewitt,
rank, Scharr, Roberts, Sobel)
Compress (80%, 50%, 30%, 10% for jpeg, 1, 5, 8 for png)
Geometric (iradon, iradon sart and swirl)
two probabilities predicted by each sub-model. AVEP predicts based
on the average predicted probabilities of all sub-models. AVEL is
based on average logits of all sub-models.
One thing worth noting is that not all of the 72 transformations
can be reversed as shown in Table 1. Transformations that cannot
be properly reversed may cause difficulties for the AE generation
algorithms to cast the perturbation on 𝑥𝑡𝑖 to 𝑥 . Though the ensemble
is claimed to be robust against AEs generated by several classical
AE generation algorithms, we would like to find out where exactly
the robustness comes from in the transformation-based ensemble?
3 METHODOLOGY
We observe that a transformation-based ensemble can include both
reversible and irreversible transformations. For ensemble based on
reversible transformations, the adversarial perturbations are able
to project back to the original image before the transformation.
However, for ensemble based on irreversible transformations, it is
impossible to do so. Hence, it is necessary to treat them differently
so as to procedure scientific analysis results.
This section mainly proposes two adaptive attacks: the TAA and
PAA for the reversible ensembles, and then explains the core design
of how we evaluate ensembles based on reversible and irreversible
transformations, respectively.
3.1 Transferability-based Adaptive Attack
Previous researches [24][5] have demonstrated that adversarial ex-
amples generated by attack algorithms targeting one specific model
may successfully fool another model with similar functionality. In
the transformation-based ensemble, each model is trained on the
same training data but after different transformation. We conjecture
that the transferability of AEs may still exist among these models
since they are performing the same classification task.
The idea of Transferability-based Adaptive Attack (TAA) comes
from Liebig’s Law of the minimum in agricultural science. It origin-
ally states that the growth is indicated not by the total resources but
by the scarcest resource [8]. In the case of an ensemble, the robust-
ness of the model to some extent is determined by the transferability
of AEs generated by a single model. Adversarial examples generated
on one ensemble member may transfer to other ensemble members,
but the transferability rate differs as the victim model which the
Algorithm 1: Transferability-based Adaptive Attack.
Input: Benign sample 𝑥 , corresponding ground truth label
𝑦, specific attack algorithm 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 , transferability
ranking 𝑡𝑟
Output: Adversarial example 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
1 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ← 𝑡𝑟 [0]
2 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← 𝑥
3 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ← transform(𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 , 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 )
4 𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑝 ← attacker.attack(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 , 𝑦)
5 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← reset(𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑝 )
6 return 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
Algorithm 2: Transferability Ranking Algorithm
Input: Benign samples 𝜒 , ground truth labels 𝛾 , attack
algorithm 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 , set of sub-models 𝑆𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠
Output: Transferability ranking 𝑡𝑟
1 (𝜒∗, 𝛾∗) ← shuffle(𝜒,𝛾) [0 : 100]
2 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ← 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡
3 foreach cand ∈ 𝑆𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 do
4 𝜒𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← 𝜒∗
5 𝜒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ← transform(𝜒𝑎𝑑𝑣 , cand)
6 𝜒𝑡𝑚𝑝 ← attacker.attack(𝜒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 )
7 𝜒𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← reset(𝜒𝑡𝑚𝑝 )
8 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 [𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑] = accuracy(cand.predict(𝜒𝑎𝑑𝑣), 𝛾∗)
9 𝑡𝑟 = sort_by_values_ascending(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)
10 return 𝑡𝑟
AEs are generated on differs. Lower transferability indicates a lower
probability that the entire ensemble is compromised at the same
time. Therefore, thinking from the attackers’ angle, the model
whose AEs have the highest transferability among all the ensemble
sub-models is the scarcest resource they are looking for, i.e., the
“weakest” sub-model in the ensemble. AEs generated against the
“weakest” ensemble member may have a higher probability of
successfully fooling the whole ensemble.
TAA, as shown in Algorithm 1, is a naive attack in which ad-
versarial examples are generated on one target ensemble member,
whose AEs have the highest transferability, trying to fool the overall
ensemble. The target sub-model is selected according to the trans-
ferability ranking algorithm as shown in Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2
is to measure the transferability of the AEs generated on certain
model by the accuracy of other sub-models on these AEs. A lower
accuracy indicates a larger number of models the generated AEs
have fooled, and hence the AEs generated on that model have a
higher transferability. This selection needs to be done only once in
advance, and can be done on a much smaller test dataset (𝜒∗, 𝛾∗),
e.g., randomly selected 100 samples.
TAA is a basic algorithm to evaluate the robustness of an en-
semble solely based on reversible transformations. The measure-
ment of the transferability of AEs using Algorithm 2 can be used
to understand the robustness source of the ensemble, which is
demonstrated later in Section 4.2.
3.2 Perturbation Aggregation Attack
As we are targeting an ensemble instead of one single model, it
is natural to aggregate adversarial perturbations generated on
all ensemble members to perform adversarial attacks. Hence, we
propose PAA as explained in Algorithm 3. In PAA, a greedy attacker
will keep generating perturbations on sub-models that have not
been fooled and aggregate those perturbations with certain aggreg-
ation strategy, until the perturbation becomes larger than a preset
perturbation budget.
Different from attack algorithms targeting one single model
which are bounded by different norms [9][3][13][17], attacking
an ensemble of more than one sub-model may also introduce per-
turbation several times larger when generating on each of them.
Therefore, PAA needs a bound score to control the overall perturb-
ation budget. Following previous work [20], we use the normalised
𝐿2 dissimilarity to measure the perturbation as shown in Equation 1.
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣, 𝑥0) =
| |𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 − 𝑥0 | |2
| |𝑥0 | |2 (1)
In the following subsections, we introduce four perturbation ag-
gregation strategies that could be used in PAA, including maximum
perturbation (MaxP), average perturbation (AvgP), the majority
vote of perturbations (MVoteP) and the weighted sum of perturb-
ations (WSumP). Theoretically, they have their own advantages
and disadvantages, however, their actual performance needs to be
experimentally evaluated.
3.2.1 Maximum Perturbation (MaxP). MaxP aggregates generated
perturbations by selecting the perturbation with the maximum
absolute value feature-wise, i.e., pixel values in image. By MaxP, it
is guaranteed that the largest perturbations can be preserved in the
aggregated perturbation.
3.2.2 Average Perturbation (AvgP). Taking the average of perturb-
ations is another straightforward solution to aggregate the ad-
versarial perturbations from all sub-models. It can averagely ap-
proximate the perturbation level pixel-wise. One possible drawback
is that there is a possibility that the individual perturbations are
averaged out, because the perturbations can be positive or negative.
3.2.3 Majority Vote Perturbations (MVoteP). MVoteP uses the pixel-
level perturbation agreed upon by most generated perturbations
as the final perturbation. Theoretically, for attack algorithms like
FGSM where the perturbations generated on different models are
discrete (i.e., 𝜖 , 0 and −𝜖), MVoteP may perform well because the
number of candidates to be voted is limited to three. For other attack
algorithms involving iterations, the perturbation may have various
values. In that case, the meaning of voting to a large number of
candidates may end up like random choosing one perturbation.
3.2.4 Weighted Sum of Perturbations (WSumP). Previous three
aggregation mechanisms treat all ensemble members equally. Since
the transferability of adversarial examples generated on different
models may be different, we design WSumP to use the weighted
sum of all perturbations from sub-models according to their trans-
ferability ranking 𝑡𝑟 which can be calculated using Algorithm 2.
WSumP aggregation assigns different weights to the perturba-
tions according to their transferability rankings. We use the follow-
ing set of weights that empirically demonstrate good performance.
Algorithm 3: Perturbation Aggregation Attack
Input: Benign sample 𝑥 , corresponding ground truth label
𝑦, set of sub-models 𝑆𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 , maximum
dissimilarity𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑑𝑖𝑠 , transferability ranking 𝑡𝑟
Output: Adversarial example 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
1 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ← 𝑆𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠
2 𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑝 ← 𝑥
3 𝑑𝑖𝑠 ← 0
4 while 𝑑𝑖𝑠 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑑𝑖𝑠 and 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑 is not 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 do
5 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← 𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑝
6 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑡𝑚𝑝 ← 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡
7 foreach 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑 in 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 do
8 𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ← transform(𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 , 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑)
9 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑡𝑚𝑝 [𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑]← reset(attacker.attack(𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ))
10 𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑝 ← aggregate(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑡𝑚𝑝 , 𝑡𝑟 )
11 foreach 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 do
12 if 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑 .predict(transform(𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣 , 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑)) ≠ 𝑦 then
13 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 .remove(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑)
14 𝑑𝑖𝑠 ← dissimilarity(𝑥𝑡𝑚𝑝 , 𝑥)
15 return 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
For the perturbations generated on the top two sub-models in the
transferability ranking list, WSumP assign 𝑁 − 2 to them, where
𝑁 is the total number of ensemble members. For the perturbations
generated on sub-models at the lowest 80% positions in the transfer-
ability ranking list, WSumP assigns 0.8 ∗ 𝑁 . The rest perturbations
are assigned with 𝑁 − 𝑖 , where 𝑖 is the the sub-model’s position in
the transferability ranking list. A soft-max operation is performed
on the weights to keep the sum of those weights equals to one and
𝑤𝑖 is the weight for the corresponding perturbation 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖 .
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑁 − 𝑖, 0.8 ∗ 𝑁, 𝑁 − 2) (2)
𝑤𝑖 ← exp𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖∑ exp𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖 (3)
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏 =
∑︁
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖 (4)
3.3 Evaluating Ensemble Defence based on
Reversible and Irreversible Transformation
For an ensemble based on reversible transformations, we can use
the proposed adaptive attack, i.e., TAA and PAA, to better evaluate
the ensemble robustness. We can also measure the transferability
of AEs among the sub-models. We expect the attack results can
provide us some evidence whether the ensemble based only on
reversible transformation can gain some robustness.
For an ensemble including irreversible transformations, TAA
and PAA cannot be adopted because they require the adversarial
perturbation to be projected back to the original input which is
impossible when the irreversible transformation exists. Hence,
we plan to evaluate the ensemble using an ensemble evaluation
method used in previous literature [20] which is also based on the
transferability of AEs.
We maintain the reversible transformation ensemble unchanged,
whose performance has been evaluated in previous steps. We ran-
domly draw a number of irreversible sub-models and add them into
the unchanged reversible transformation ensemble while strictly
controlling the proportion of the numbers of reversible and irrevers-
ible sub-models. We shall observe the influence on the ensemble ro-
bustness against AEs from the number of newly-added irreversible
sub-models. Furthermore, if an ensemble demonstrates robustness,
we intend to further measure the impact of the number of ensemble
members on the ensemble robustness.
4 EXPERIMENT
4.1 Experiment Setup
Model. The sub-model structure is shown in Figure 2, which con-
sists of three convolutional layers followed by two fully connec-
ted layers and one soft-max layer [20]. The transformation-based
ensemble combines the sub-model in the way we introduced in
Figure 1 in Section 2.3. We put the 72 transformations (see Table 1)
into our transformation pool, which includes 14 reversible trans-
formations and 58 irreversible transformations. We construct the
reversible transformation ensemble and irreversible transformation
ensemble by drawing candidate transformation from this pool.
There are 5 ensemble strategies evaluated, i.e., Random Defence
(RD), Majority Voting (MV), Top 2Majority Voting (T2MV), Average
Probabilities (AVEP), Average Logits (AVEL) (Detailed explanations
can be found in Section 2.3.).
Dataset. We evaluate the robustness of the ensemble on the
MNIST dataset [15]. MNIST dataset contains 70,000 grey-scale
images of hand-written digits. We further split the original testing
data (10,000 images) into validation and testing set at the ratio
of 1:1. Early-stopping technique based on cross-entropy loss on
validation dataset is adopted to prevent models from over-fitting
during training.
Figure 2: Structure of the Sub-Model.
Base attack algorithms used in TAA and PAA.We assume
that the attacker has full knowledge of the ensemble including
the transformation pre-processing, the model parameters, and the
ensemble strategy. We utilise 4 representative attack algorithms
in our experiments, i.e., FGSM, PGD, C&W, and DeepFool. We set
the parameters for these algorithms in an overkill way [1][10][20]
as the findings in recent work by Tramèr et al [31] indicate that
proper attack parameters and sufficient iterations are essential for
an attack to converge so as to provide convincing evaluation results.
The parameters are set as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters for Attack Algorithms
Attack
Algorithm
Parameters
in TAA
Parameters
in PAA
FGSM norm=∞,
𝜖=0.3
norm=∞,
𝜖=0.05
PGD
norm=∞,
𝜖=0.3,
maximum iterations=100
norm=∞,
𝜖=0.05,
maximum iterations=250
C&W
norm=2,
binary search steps=10,
initial constant=0.01,
learning rate=0.01,
maximum iterations=100
DeepFool
norm=2,
maximum iterations=100,
overshoot=1e-6,
number of candidates=3
4.2 Transferability among Models Trained on
Differently Transformed Training Data
It has been observed that transferability of AEs exists among mod-
els performing the same classification task [24]. This experiment
is designed to understand whether the transferability still exists
among the models trained on the same data but after different trans-
formations. It refers to reversible transformation here because the
perturbation generated on input after irreversible transformation
cannot be projected back to the original input, and hence it does
not make much sense to evaluate its transferability when the entire
image is disturbed by the irreversible transformation.
First of all, we trained 15 models, one model of which is trained
on the original MNIST training data records while the other 14 are
trained on the same batch of data records but after the 14 reversible
transformations as shown in Table 1 with the label unchanged,
respectively. Then, we generate AEs with FGSM, PGD, C&W and
DeepFool on every model and evaluate their transferability rates.
The transferability rate of the AEs generated on one model is
measured by calculating the rate of successful attacks on other
models. The results are demonstrated in Table 3. The transformation
operations are used to indicate the model trained on the data after
that transformation, while “original” means the model trained on
the original data records.
It can be seen in Table 3 that AEs generated using FGSM and
PGD generally have high transferability rates. On average 49.53% of
AEs generated on the “original” model with FGSM can fool models
trained on data after reversible transformations. This number for
PGD is even more significant, with on average 65.88% of AEs gener-
ated on the “original” model using PGD can fool the other models
while this number rises to as high as 76.84% on AEs generated on
“shift top left” model using PGD.
Generally, for the AEs generated using FGSM and PGD onmodels
trained on data after one specific transformation, they all have a
high successful rate in fooling the models trained on other trans-
formations. This indicates that the transferability of AEs does exist
among models trained on data after reversible transformations.
Such models cannot block the AEs from transferring, meaning that
those models may have similar decision boundaries even trained on
data after different transformations. It also implies that an ensemble
Table 3: Transferability Rate of Adversarial Examples Generated on Different Sub-Models
Victim
Model
Attack
Method
no.
of AEs original
flip
both
flip
horizontal
flip
vertical
rotate
180
rotate
270
rotate
90
shift
bottom
left
shift
bottom
right
shift
down
shift
left
shift
right
shift
top
left
shift
top
right
shift
up Average
origianl
FGSM 3538 100.00% 54.61% 53.82% 50.59% 47.09% 38.75% 54.04% 59.61% 44.52% 47.23% 56.11% 54.15% 39.15% 48.53% 45.20% 49.53%
PGD 4971 100.00% 75.32% 75.66% 72.84% 57.23% 57.33% 74.31% 69.66% 59.34% 65.84% 76.18% 67.65% 48.78% 57.80% 64.43% 65.88%
C&W 2303 100.00% 5.86% 9.03% 6.64% 6.08% 5.73% 8.03% 11.33% 9.73% 8.94% 9.29% 10.81% 4.56% 7.08% 8.42% 7.97%
Deepfool 4844 100.00% 1.82% 2.31% 1.61% 1.51% 2.11% 1.32% 4.79% 2.89% 2.75% 2.39% 2.29% 1.30% 3.53% 1.69% 2.31%
flip
both
FGSM 3222 35.29% 100.00% 52.27% 49.50% 45.47% 37.96% 45.78% 58.75% 41.37% 46.62% 48.57% 51.49% 37.21% 51.27% 37.31% 45.63%
PGD 4986 53.39% 100.00% 73.14% 70.82% 60.55% 47.81% 65.50% 67.49% 54.21% 57.28% 69.33% 60.09% 46.23% 59.69% 50.82% 59.74%
C&W 2742 6.20% 100.00% 8.68% 4.78% 7.77% 6.31% 6.71% 11.01% 8.53% 7.59% 9.01% 8.97% 5.36% 9.30% 8.75% 7.78%
Deepfool 4811 2.45% 100.00% 1.75% 1.16% 1.60% 1.62% 1.27% 4.14% 2.45% 1.97% 2.37% 1.89% 1.70% 2.74% 1.23% 2.03%
flip
hori-
zontal
FGSM 3242 33.13% 45.43% 100.00% 41.64% 38.80% 28.22% 44.23% 53.27% 39.39% 45.10% 45.56% 51.02% 33.50% 44.39% 30.54% 41.02%
PGD 4974 58.58% 72.34% 100.00% 67.23% 54.06% 40.57% 73.66% 65.48% 58.85% 64.86% 70.71% 70.39% 46.86% 57.94% 61.74% 61.66%
C&W 3246 4.65% 4.25% 100.00% 3.45% 3.82% 3.76% 5.85% 8.19% 6.56% 5.55% 6.10% 7.05% 3.45% 5.36% 5.82% 5.28%
Deepfool 4824 1.64% 1.49% 100.00% 1.33% 1.29% 1.33% 1.18% 3.25% 2.43% 1.49% 1.68% 1.70% 1.43% 2.16% 1.20% 1.69%
flip
vertical
FGSM 3120 37.12% 56.63% 50.83% 100.00% 44.42% 37.88% 48.53% 61.31% 47.98% 53.43% 52.60% 54.71% 36.63% 54.46% 35.26% 47.99%
PGD 4982 59.98% 76.80% 72.02% 100.00% 55.52% 50.52% 69.95% 67.84% 60.26% 68.59% 74.55% 62.51% 46.95% 63.33% 56.70% 63.25%
C&W 2555 7.79% 5.75% 8.57% 100.00% 7.51% 5.75% 8.10% 11.86% 8.57% 8.77% 10.68% 9.43% 4.66% 8.96% 8.26% 8.19%
Deepfool 4833 2.46% 1.76% 2.13% 100.00% 1.74% 1.53% 1.43% 3.81% 2.92% 2.40% 2.79% 1.97% 1.72% 3.23% 1.14% 2.22%
rotate
180
FGSM 3673 27.61% 44.49% 40.29% 36.78% 100.00% 35.94% 40.10% 56.47% 36.13% 39.97% 41.66% 46.53% 33.38% 48.46% 38.91% 40.48%
PGD 4967 44.43% 66.68% 60.90% 56.01% 100.00% 55.10% 59.57% 59.55% 46.77% 52.53% 55.33% 57.18% 44.15% 57.48% 50.75% 54.75%
C&W 2704 4.62% 4.62% 5.29% 3.22% 100.00% 5.10% 5.10% 6.62% 6.36% 5.92% 5.44% 6.32% 3.37% 5.10% 5.77% 5.20%
Deepfool 4819 1.74% 1.22% 1.56% 1.25% 100.00% 1.81% 1.08% 2.22% 2.03% 1.45% 1.29% 1.51% 1.29% 1.89% 1.04% 1.53%
rotate
270
FGSM 3417 38.54% 50.28% 48.11% 44.28% 51.62% 100.00% 48.11% 62.54% 44.54% 49.40% 49.96% 54.73% 43.69% 57.74% 49.84% 49.53%
PGD 4975 65.15% 73.65% 68.30% 69.59% 76.60% 100.00% 64.22% 67.20% 58.23% 64.34% 69.43% 64.62% 54.99% 67.80% 73.63% 66.98%
C&W 2038 10.84% 9.47% 10.01% 9.03% 12.27% 100.00% 9.27% 13.25% 10.89% 9.18% 10.40% 11.73% 6.43% 10.11% 11.53% 10.31%
Deepfool 4815 4.63% 2.99% 3.18% 2.76% 3.39% 100.00% 1.81% 4.03% 3.45% 2.66% 3.03% 3.05% 1.89% 3.07% 2.22% 3.01%
rotate
90
FGSM 3322 35.07% 47.56% 48.62% 40.49% 43.11% 32.30% 100.00% 57.41% 39.28% 43.32% 48.62% 49.25% 32.87% 50.00% 33.68% 42.97%
PGD 4979 59.43% 65.92% 74.25% 65.47% 55.19% 40.73% 100.00% 66.98% 53.85% 59.71% 71.44% 59.67% 42.68% 53.32% 47.86% 58.32%
C&W 3157 5.89% 4.28% 6.18% 3.93% 4.47% 2.47% 100.00% 7.00% 6.65% 5.57% 5.04% 5.48% 2.50% 3.99% 4.56% 4.86%
Deepfool 4809 1.71% 1.37% 1.41% 1.16% 1.39% 1.06% 100.00% 2.14% 1.95% 1.46% 1.37% 1.31% 0.87% 1.77% 0.87% 1.42%
shift
bottom
left
FGSM 4014 32.39% 42.60% 42.10% 35.13% 36.07% 26.91% 42.97% 100.00% 45.39% 56.13% 42.43% 46.81% 31.99% 48.56% 28.23% 39.84%
PGD 4958 47.16% 59.48% 59.04% 48.37% 43.18% 36.12% 61.34% 100.00% 63.05% 77.11% 60.67% 56.62% 44.68% 53.21% 34.59% 53.19%
C&W 2511 5.85% 4.54% 6.21% 4.26% 3.78% 3.42% 4.02% 100.00% 8.68% 8.52% 5.50% 6.33% 3.07% 4.42% 3.50% 5.15%
Deepfool 4809 1.85% 1.35% 1.58% 1.16% 0.94% 1.08% 0.85% 100.00% 2.43% 1.81% 1.43% 1.54% 0.89% 1.33% 1.08% 1.38%
shift
bottom
right
FGSM 3980 24.25% 34.17% 32.86% 32.91% 32.29% 24.10% 33.32% 51.66% 100.00% 46.98% 30.73% 51.48% 20.33% 45.48% 23.22% 34.55%
PGD 4961 40.88% 47.51% 51.66% 49.00% 36.30% 32.15% 48.16% 61.18% 100.00% 71.78% 47.25% 64.99% 29.69% 54.83% 34.51% 47.85%
C&W 2479 4.64% 3.51% 5.08% 3.67% 2.94% 2.99% 3.63% 9.08% 100.00% 5.93% 4.44% 6.05% 3.03% 5.57% 3.47% 4.57%
Deepfool 4822 1.51% 0.83% 1.31% 0.97% 1.16% 0.95% 0.79% 2.86% 100.00% 1.91% 1.20% 1.51% 0.97% 2.24% 0.71% 1.35%
shift
down
FGSM 3418 27.30% 37.45% 43.86% 36.42% 38.71% 26.62% 40.78% 63.78% 52.14% 100.00% 41.43% 49.15% 25.01% 42.83% 25.89% 39.38%
PGD 4972 46.70% 56.32% 62.99% 56.80% 44.83% 36.71% 57.64% 77.96% 73.83% 100.00% 63.25% 61.10% 33.39% 51.11% 41.23% 54.56%
C&W 2879 5.04% 3.65% 5.18% 3.40% 3.99% 3.89% 4.48% 10.49% 11.11% 100.00% 5.90% 5.77% 2.78% 5.21% 4.62% 5.39%
Deepfool 4818 1.70% 1.20% 1.18% 1.04% 1.20% 1.39% 0.98% 3.59% 3.18% 100.00% 1.52% 1.33% 1.02% 2.14% 0.91% 1.60%
shift
left
FGSM 3184 37.91% 46.26% 47.02% 41.05% 39.60% 32.16% 47.39% 58.13% 34.33% 44.79% 100.00% 47.36% 36.97% 46.14% 33.79% 42.35%
PGD 4971 59.65% 74.37% 73.51% 71.56% 53.37% 44.84% 71.86% 68.24% 49.85% 64.55% 100.00% 65.76% 44.24% 55.62% 45.32% 60.19%
C&W 3144 6.20% 4.96% 7.38% 5.38% 5.25% 2.99% 5.79% 8.33% 6.74% 7.25% 100.00% 8.43% 3.34% 4.61% 5.18% 5.85%
Deepfool 4804 1.60% 1.33% 1.75% 1.31% 1.31% 1.12% 0.96% 2.75% 1.96% 1.52% 100.00% 1.42% 0.94% 1.67% 0.96% 1.47%
shift
right
FGSM 3655 28.34% 40.16% 44.49% 35.95% 35.90% 29.49% 35.16% 52.50% 44.65% 42.60% 38.58% 100.00% 30.07% 54.06% 32.80% 38.91%
PGD 4967 44.01% 57.56% 65.67% 54.66% 43.47% 37.59% 49.63% 57.94% 62.23% 57.28% 60.04% 100.00% 38.74% 65.11% 45.00% 52.78%
C&W 2922 3.97% 2.46% 4.11% 2.94% 3.52% 2.46% 3.08% 6.30% 5.99% 3.90% 4.86% 100.00% 2.74% 5.41% 4.76% 4.04%
Deepfool 4812 1.68% 0.83% 1.25% 1.00% 1.00% 1.12% 0.89% 2.45% 2.29% 1.39% 1.18% 100.00% 0.96% 2.33% 1.06% 1.39%
shift
top
left
FGSM 4225 48.78% 66.08% 60.59% 59.55% 61.54% 53.02% 60.14% 74.06% 49.14% 56.36% 61.96% 63.36% 100.00% 69.73% 61.40% 60.41%
PGD 4974 70.71% 83.21% 82.59% 80.56% 77.16% 68.09% 80.94% 80.68% 65.08% 69.18% 79.37% 76.72% 100.00% 79.25% 82.25% 76.84%
C&W 1490 12.42% 12.68% 17.72% 9.80% 13.02% 9.40% 10.81% 19.19% 15.10% 13.89% 13.76% 16.78% 100.00% 15.10% 17.65% 14.09%
Deepfool 4811 4.76% 5.24% 5.28% 3.66% 3.03% 3.43% 2.60% 6.63% 4.99% 3.37% 4.18% 3.89% 100.00% 5.94% 3.93% 4.35%
shift
top
right
FGSM 3883 29.15% 44.14% 41.95% 41.77% 41.10% 35.85% 38.58% 57.53% 44.60% 42.96% 42.21% 56.97% 35.31% 100.00% 43.99% 42.58%
PGD 4971 46.29% 65.16% 58.34% 61.15% 49.35% 46.17% 55.20% 61.44% 59.93% 53.97% 57.51% 71.03% 48.72% 100.00% 55.84% 56.44%
C&W 2371 5.61% 4.47% 6.20% 5.10% 5.44% 4.72% 4.56% 8.10% 8.65% 7.51% 5.86% 8.94% 4.81% 100.00% 5.44% 6.10%
Deepfool 4824 1.78% 1.37% 1.49% 1.55% 1.39% 1.16% 0.89% 1.97% 2.63% 1.58% 1.24% 2.09% 1.16% 100.00% 1.35% 1.55%
shift
up
FGSM 3214 32.17% 44.49% 47.70% 38.46% 43.03% 37.40% 41.54% 58.59% 38.67% 42.81% 43.62% 50.19% 39.73% 53.27% 100.00% 43.69%
PGD 4980 59.46% 65.60% 75.22% 66.55% 65.56% 58.33% 62.97% 62.43% 55.00% 60.80% 62.11% 64.28% 59.48% 66.59% 100.00% 63.17%
C&W 2696 7.94% 6.75% 9.53% 5.90% 7.83% 5.38% 6.38% 11.20% 8.79% 8.72% 7.31% 11.28% 5.71% 9.31% 100.00% 8.00%
Deepfool 4826 2.51% 1.78% 2.13% 1.41% 1.66% 1.89% 1.35% 2.90% 3.03% 1.91% 1.82% 2.38% 1.68% 3.32% 100.00% 2.13%
of such models may not be able to improve the robustness as long
as the transformation is reversible. Since the ensemble strategy
also plays an important role in an ensemble, this conjecture needs
further validation which will be shown in Section 4.3.
Most importantly, it is observed that the transferability rate of
AEs differs as the victim model differs. For example, on average
76.18% of AEs generated on the model trained on examples shifted
to their top-left with PGD can transfer to other sub-models, while
only 34.59% of AEs generated with PGD on the model trained on
examples shifted to their bottom left can transfer to other models.
Hence, it implies a good tactic for the attacker to fool the ensemble
by generating AEs targeting the top sub-model in the transferability
ranking list.
Also, we notice that AEs generated with gradient-based attack
algorithms (e.g., PGD and FGSM) are more transferable compared
to those generated with optimisation-based attack algorithms (e.g.,
C&W and DeepFool) while the number of successful AEs on their
victimmodels are at the same scale. Due to the facts that optimisation-
based attacks like C&W and DeepFool generate more subtle perturb-
ations and more specific to the victim model, it is reasonable that
the transferability rate of their generated perturbations is lower.
4.3 TAA Experiment Results
As shown in Section 4.2, despite the models are trained on data
that have been gone through different reversible transformations,
AEs generated on one model can actually transfer to other models
for the same classification task at a high probability. Therefore,
the ensemble based on reversible transformations may face a po-
tential threat that AEs generated on one of its sub-models may
fool the entire ensemble. However, it still depends on the ensemble
strategy adopted in the ensemble. In an untargeted attack, AEs are
generated to fool the victim sub-model no matter which label the
erroneous output is. For example, if the ensemble uses majority
voting ensemble strategy, it is not sure whether the AE can fool the
majority sub-models to output an agreed erroneous output. Hence,
this experiment is necessary to better evaluate the robustness of
the ensemble based on reversible transformations under various
ensemble strategies.
The target ensemble is the ensemble of the 14 sub-models that
are trained on the data after 14 reversible transformations. The
“original” model is not included in this ensemble. We generate AEs
on every sub-model using attack algorithms on the test dataset of
5000 examples. Five ensemble strategies are measured, i.e., RD, MV,
T2MV, AVEP, and AVEL.
In practice, an attacker can select to attack only the sub-model,
whose AE has the highest transferability, to achieve a high success
attack rate, which is the core idea of TAA. Here, we show the full res-
ults instead of just the top 𝑡𝑟 ranked one for readers to have a better
overview and understanding of attack results on ensembles using
different ensemble strategies when choosing different target sub-
model. The overall results in terms of the ensemble classification
accuracy under such attacks are listed in Table 4. The performance
of the ensemble under no attack is shown as “benign”.
Under PGD-base TAA, the “shift top left” is at the top of the
𝑡𝑟 list. It can be seen from Table 4 that attackers can lower the
ensemble accuracy to around 15% by generating AEs against this
sub-model using PGD-based TAA. Generally, AEs generated by
FGSM and PGD lower the ensemble accuracy more than that by
C&W and DeepFool, which is consistent with the transferability
ranking experimental results.
It is worth noting that the robustness from integrating different
reversible transformation sub-models is fragile even when the
attacker only knows the classification task and training data. This
can be seen from the Table 4 where the AEs generated against the
“original” model which is not even in the ensemble can lower the
ensemble accuracy to around 30%.
4.4 PAA Experiment Results
Unlike TAA which depends on the transferable nature of AEs to
attack an ensemble of models, PAA is more specifically designed for
ensemble defence. It utilises all possible perturbations generated
on sub-models to perform an adversarial attack on an ensemble.
The stealthiness of AEs generated by PAA are bound by normal-
ised dissimilarity (see Equation 1). The dissimilarity score is set to
0.3 in this experiment since we notice the average dissimilarity in
Table 4 is around this value. The classification accuracy of ensemble
under PAA-generated AEs on the test dataset is shown in Table 5.
Table 4: Ensemble Accuracy on AEs Generated on Only
One Sub-Model. The last column “Dis” is the normalised
dissimilarity score defined in Equation 1.
Target
Model
Attack
Method RD MV T2MV AP AL Average Dis
Benign 99.36% 99.70% 96.48% 99.68% 99.68% 98.81% N.A.
original
FGSM 58.68% 69.44% 66.84% 69.24% 68.52% 66.54% 0.5565
PGD 34.26% 33.24% 34.84% 31.54% 30.62% 32.90% 0.6077
C&W 97.00% 98.58% 92.82% 98.86% 98.82% 97.22% 0.1089
Deepfool 97.90% 99.50% 92.30% 99.52% 99.62% 97.77% 0.1363
flip
both
FGSM 67.82% 72.94% 66.68% 72.10% 70.90% 70.09% 0.5493
PGD 30.42% 38.54% 26.68% 37.02% 21.74% 30.88% 0.5952
C&W 94.52% 98.42% 92.02% 98.52% 98.62% 96.42% 0.1344
Deepfool 97.16% 99.38% 91.60% 99.46% 99.54% 97.43% 0.1287
flip
hori-
zontal
FGSM 69.00% 75.66% 69.54% 75.00% 73.00% 72.44% 0.5488
PGD 28.30% 35.94% 24.46% 34.00% 13.60% 27.26% 0.5940
C&W 94.84% 98.64% 91.58% 98.70% 98.90% 96.53% 0.1508
Deepfool 98.72% 99.46% 90.34% 99.50% 99.62% 97.53% 0.1203
flip
vertical
FGSM 63.92% 71.50% 66.96% 70.82% 69.28% 68.50% 0.5841
PGD 31.40% 35.82% 27.04% 33.30% 17.54% 29.02% 0.6202
C&W 94.40% 98.48% 91.54% 98.48% 98.52% 96.28% 0.1257
Deepfool 98.10% 99.40% 90.30% 99.50% 99.54% 97.37% 0.1366
rotate
180
FGSM 71.98% 74.62% 68.66% 73.42% 72.14% 72.16% 0.5423
PGD 42.46% 44.14% 32.30% 42.68% 28.34% 37.98% 0.5758
C&W 96.70% 98.94% 92.34% 98.88% 99.06% 97.18% 0.1245
Deepfool 98.02% 99.62% 91.16% 99.64% 99.66% 97.62% 0.1284
rotate
270
FGSM 57.56% 68.04% 63.56% 67.94% 67.12% 64.84% 0.5486
PGD 26.48% 28.42% 19.88% 26.90% 17.40% 23.82% 0.5731
C&W 95.34% 98.14% 91.70% 98.10% 98.18% 96.29% 0.1043
Deepfool 97.98% 99.16% 87.68% 99.22% 99.32% 96.67% 0.1463
rotate
90
FGSM 65.18% 74.04% 67.54% 73.22% 70.80% 70.16% 0.5785
PGD 50.92% 39.78% 27.22% 38.10% 18.72% 34.95% 0.5808
C&W 96.98% 98.94% 92.22% 99.06% 98.98% 97.24% 0.1505
Deepfool 98.76% 99.60% 91.70% 99.64% 99.70% 97.88% 0.1216
shift
bottom
left
FGSM 53.50% 73.74% 68.40% 72.50% 69.38% 67.50% 0.5864
PGD 39.26% 46.88% 35.18% 45.08% 30.70% 39.42% 0.5951
C&W 94.98% 99.26% 92.96% 99.22% 99.20% 97.12% 0.1081
Deepfool 99.02% 99.62% 93.68% 99.66% 99.72% 98.34% 0.1190
shift
bottom
right
FGSM 73.26% 77.12% 71.96% 77.22% 75.46% 75.00% 0.5160
PGD 38.50% 53.82% 40.34% 51.80% 40.44% 44.98% 0.5970
C&W 98.08% 99.04% 93.20% 99.08% 99.20% 97.72% 0.1079
Deepfool 97.84% 99.62% 92.28% 99.64% 99.70% 97.82% 0.1146
shift
down
FGSM 80.66% 76.82% 69.72% 76.16% 74.10% 75.49% 0.5391
PGD 26.76% 44.94% 32.22% 43.32% 28.06% 35.06% 0.6097
C&W 96.54% 99.06% 92.10% 99.08% 99.16% 97.19% 0.1316
Deepfool 98.64% 99.54% 93.44% 99.64% 99.68% 98.19% 0.1183
shift
left
FGSM 68.38% 76.06% 68.54% 75.30% 73.28% 72.31% 0.5346
PGD 28.90% 38.86% 26.58% 36.00% 18.70% 29.81% 0.5962
C&W 96.06% 98.44% 89.98% 98.58% 98.64% 96.34% 0.1491
Deepfool 98.56% 99.58% 92.16% 99.58% 99.58% 97.89% 0.1182
shift
right
FGSM 70.76% 75.38% 69.04% 74.62% 71.82% 72.32% 0.5219
PGD 56.72% 46.88% 33.50% 45.32% 27.10% 41.90% 0.6094
C&W 97.12% 99.16% 92.88% 99.20% 99.24% 97.52% 0.1288
Deepfool 97.40% 99.52% 92.42% 99.58% 99.58% 97.70% 0.1211
shift
top
left
FGSM 34.36% 48.30% 44.26% 47.54% 46.88% 44.27% 0.5610
PGD 24.08% 16.74% 11.76% 15.38% 10.54% 15.70% 0.6127
C&W 95.18% 97.78% 91.22% 98.02% 98.30% 96.10% 0.0798
Deepfool 93.98% 99.28% 85.84% 99.26% 99.36% 95.54% 0.1617
shift
top
right
FGSM 72.06% 71.04% 64.60% 70.26% 68.20% 69.23% 0.5271
PGD 42.72% 42.84% 29.26% 41.54% 27.24% 36.72% 0.6096
C&W 96.48% 98.88% 92.42% 98.94% 98.94% 97.13% 0.1086
Deepfool 99.02% 99.42% 91.70% 99.54% 99.54% 97.84% 0.1263
shift
up
FGSM 61.88% 75.40% 70.48% 74.78% 73.30% 71.17% 0.5464
PGD 33.24% 34.66% 25.56% 32.90% 19.62% 29.20% 0.6072
C&W 94.80% 98.00% 90.56% 98.22% 98.32% 95.98% 0.1283
Deepfool 98.26% 99.50% 90.28% 99.48% 99.54% 97.41% 0.1316
Four perturbation aggregation strategies are evaluated i.e., MaxP,
AvgP, MVoteP, and WSumP.
We can see from Table 5, for PAA using FGSM, PGD and Deep-
Fool as base attack algorithms, at least one of the four aggregation
strategies makes the ensemble accuracy drop to around 20%. Under
the PGD attack combining WSumP aggregation, the classification
accuracy of the transformation-based ensemble drops from 99.70%
Table 5: Ensemble Accuracy on AEs Generated by PAA
Attack
Algorithm
Aggregation
Strategy
Ensemble Strategy
RD MV T2MV AVEP AVEL
Benign 99.36% 99.70% 96.48% 99.68% 99.68%
FGSM
MaxP 94.19% 94.87% 88.68% 95.31% 95.51%
AvgP 21.25% 20.59% 39.42% 20.63% 22.30%
MVoteP 47.86% 63.68% 65.38% 63.66% 65.30%
WSumP 21.13% 21.90% 39.94% 21.96% 24.02%
PGD
MaxP 84.11% 90.40% 86.82% 90.63% 91.31%
AvgP 22.66% 15.32% 38.28% 15.28% 17.25%
MVoteP 62.00% 68.09% 71.11% 68.65% 70.21%
WSumP 17.41% 16.65% 38.36% 16.97% 19.23%
C&W
MaxP 92.86% 91.84% 90.82% 91.84% 92.86%
AvgP 52.04% 62.24% 72.45% 57.17% 56.12%
MVoteP 85.71% 92.86% 85.23% 94.90% 93.88%
WSumP 65.31% 76.53% 75.51% 69.39% 67.35%
DeepFool
MaxP 39.88% 40.59% 54.35% 40.74% 42.82%
AvgP 25.51% 23.47% 32.68% 23.47% 21.43%
MVoteP 16.25% 15.68% 31.01% 16.84% 18.27%
WSumP 25.51% 17.35% 31.63% 19.39% 20.41%
on benign samples to 16.65%. Some adversarial examples generated
using PGD-based TAA and PGD-based PAA are available in Figure 3.
Unlike TAA, aggregated adversarial perturbations generated by
C&W and DeepFool also have impressive attack effect. For PAA
using C&W, the ensemble accuracy is lowered to around 70%.
Also, the perturbation aggregation strategy acts as an important
role in our PAA algorithm. WSumP and AvgP generally outperform
the other two aggregation strategies. For example, the classification
accuracy of ensemble using AVEL ensemble strategy is 95.51% on
FGSM-based PAA AEs using MaxP aggregation strategy, while the
classification accuracy is 22.30% under the same setting except
that AvgP aggregation is used. We observe that, under the same
setting, classification accuracy on AEs generated by PAAwith AvgP
and WSumP as aggregation strategy is similar. This can be easily
explained that for an ensemble with 14 members, 12 of them share
the same weight during WSumP according to Equation 3. However,
this little difference in weights improves the attack effectiveness by
dropping the ensemble accuracy 5% more in some cases when using
PGD and DeepFool. We believe that the attack effectiveness can be
further improved by fine-tuning the WSumP weights in Equation 3,
which is though not the main focus in this experiment.
In summary, the TAA and PAA experiments show that the en-
semble solely based on reversible transformations cannot provide us
with the expected robustness. The transferability still widely exists
among the sub-models trained on data after different reversible
transformations, which may be one of the fundamental reasons
that such an ensemble is not robust against AEs. For those attack
algorithms whose AEs have less transferability, PAA can assist them
to succeed an impressive attack against the reversible ensemble.
4.5 Evaluating Ensemble Defence Based on
Irreversible Transformations
To validate the influence of sub-models based on irreversible trans-
formation on the overall robustness of an ensemble, we design an
experiment by gradually incorporating more such sub-models into
the previously evaluated ensemble of 14 reversible sub-models and
measuring their accuracy. The number of irreversible sub-models
𝑚 are the multiples of the number 14, i.e., 𝑚 ∈ {0, 14, 28, 42, 56}.
Figure 3: Examples of AEs Generated Using TAA and PAA.
Moreover, we also evaluate the robustness of ensemble of𝑚 sub-
models solely based on irreversible transformations.
In this experiment, AEs are generated on the original model
with TAA attack parameters in Table 2. We generate AEs on the
original model for the following two reasons. First of all, TAA
and PAA are not available due to the introduction of irreversible
transformation sub-models. Secondly, it has been demonstrated
in the TAA experiment that the AEs generated on the original
model can effectively attack the reversible transformation ensemble,
which could serve as a baseline. We repeat the random drawing
and evaluating process for five times for every value of𝑚.
The full results onMNIST dataset are shown in Appendix Table 6.
Regarding C&W and DeepFool, we have already understood well
in Section 4.2 that their generated AEs have limited transferability
among models based on reversible transformations. Table 6 further
confirms this results by showing that their generated AEs do not
affect the ensembles much, no matter the ensemble is based on
reversible or irreversible transformations. However, under FGSM
and PGD attacks, we can see that all the ensembles cannot provide
expected robustness. Specifically, we can observe that there is a
slight accuracy increase (less than 10%) when adding the first batch
of 14 irreversible sub-models into the ensemble of 14 reversible sub-
models. However, this increase does not persist as more irreversible
sub-models are added. Comparing two ensembles of the same
number of 14 reversible sub-models and 14 irreversible sub-models,
the irreversible ensemble showing slightly advantage in accuracy,
i.e., less than 10% under the FGSM attack and less than 20% under
the PGD attack. Also, for the ensemble purly based on irreversible
sub-models, increasing the number of sub-models does not increase
the ensemble accuracy much.
For illustration purpose, we demonstrate the results of ensembles
using MV strategy on AEs generated using PGD in Figure 4. The
blue line represents the ensemble of 14 sub-models of reversible
transformations plus𝑚 sub-models of irreversible transformations.
The orange line represents the ensemble of𝑚 sub-models solely
Figure 4: Classification accuracy of ensembles with different
number of sub-models predicted with MV strategy.
based on irreversible transformations. The x-axis is the total number
of sub-models in the ensemble.
From Figure 4, we can observe that classification accuracy under
attack increases a little bit as the number of sub-models in the
ensemble increases when the ensemble is gradually added in sub-
models based on irreversible transformations (i.e., the blue line).
Since the number of sub-models on reversible transformations in
this ensemble is fixed, this may imply that sub-models on irrevers-
ible transformations bring robustness to the original ensemble with
sub-models on reversible transformations only. For an ensemble
of models based on irreversible transformations, the classification
accuracy does not change much with respect to the number of
sub-models in an ensemble (i.e., the orange line). The classification
accuracy of ensemble solely based on irreversible transformations
is always higher than the hybrid ensemble of sub-models on both
kinds of transformations, suggesting that sub-models on irreversible
transformations may provide more robustness than sub-models on
reversible transformations do. However, the accuracy under attacks
is much lower than the benign performance, which indicates that
transformation-based ensemble alone may not be able to provide
us with enough robustness. These observations are also supported
by the experimental results on FasionMNIST dataset [34] which
are available in Appendix Table 7.
5 RELATEDWORK
5.1 Adversarial Machine Learning
It is well recognised that machine learning algorithms are vulner-
able to adversarial examples which are crafted by adding small,
human-imperceptible perturbations to legitimate input samples.
There have been various attack algorithms to compute the ad-
versarial perturbations. For a differentiable machine learning model,
attack algorithms can utilise the model gradient information to
compute a perturbation which increases the loss function value of
the legitimate input to its correct label. It leads the model to predict
a wrong label with a smaller loss function value than that of the
correct label [2, 9, 13, 17]. For non-differentiable classifiers like de-
cision trees and random forests, attackers can apply more complex
strategies [12] or transfer the adversarial example generated with a
surrogate model [27]. Attackers can also use the optimisation-based
attack algorithms which are to find the optimised perturbation by
maximising or minimising their objective instead of just finding any
perturbation that works [3, 4, 19]. More intriguingly, there are 𝐿1
norm bounded attack algorithms to limit the number of perturbed
pixels [3, 25], universal adversarial perturbations that work for all
examples in the test dataset [21, 33], etc.
Recently, the adaptive attack, which is the attack specifically
designed for certain defence mechanisms, has been gaining more
andmore attention due to its impressive attack effect [3, 31]. Tramer
et al. [31] evaluated 13 defence methods proposed in the year of
2019 by performing adaptive attacks on them as the evaluation of
robustness under worst-case scenario. Unfortunately, all of these 13
defence methods fail to protect victim model from corresponding
adaptive attacks while majority of adaptive attacks on them are
iterative attack algorithms like PGD with multiple random starts
and larger number of iterations. Our paper borrows the core idea
of the classical attack algorithms and proposes adaptive attack
algorithms targeting the transformation-based ensemble defence,
fully considering the learnt lessons about the importance of evalu-
ating under sufficient strong settings [31].
5.2 Ensemble Defence
There is a continuous arms race between the machine learning
attack and defence. It is of great significance to defend machine
learningmodels against such attacks so that the models can produce
trustworthy output that we can rely on. Researchers have put a large
amount of effort in defending machine learning models[29][23][26],
among which the ensemble defence is an important branch.
Ensemble as a defence method is an easy but efficient way to
protect models from adversarial attacks especially under black-
box scenarios when the ensemble details are unknown to attackers.
There are ensembles promoting the diversity among sub-models [23],
using different precision of weights and activation functions in sub-
models [28], training an ensemble of binary-classifiers with suffi-
cient diversity and redundancy [32], combining sub-models trained
on data after different transformations [20], etc. It is shown that
even simple combination of undefended classifiers with different
random noise has similar robustness to the adversarial training [3,
16] and advanced ensembles with guaranteed diversity [20, 23, 29,
32] demonstrate superior performance. However, in the attack and
defence arms race, some defences are soon broken by adaptive
attacks [10, 23, 28, 31]. In order to better understand the effect-
iveness of transformation-based ensemble defence [20], we utilise
transferability analysis and propose two adaptive attack algorithms,
i.e., TAA and PAA. The results reveal that the transformation-based
ensemble defence can provide some but not enough robustness
against AEs. The gained robustness is mainly from the irreversible
transformation sub-models, and increasing the number ensemble
sub-models does not increase the ensemble robustness.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we designed adaptive attacks to evaluate the robust-
ness of the transformation-based ensemble defence and conducted
controlled experiments to analyse the reason for such robustness by
considering transformation types. The experimental results indic-
ated that transformation-based ensemble defence cannot provide
expected robustness. Though our experimental findings are not
positive in trusting machine learning models with critical tasks,
they provide us with more detailed understanding why we cannot
rely on such defence. There is a necessity of continuous defence
effort in this machine learning attack and defence arms race.
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A APPENDIX
Table 6: Classification Accuracy of Ensembles on MNIST
with Different Sub-Models Under Adversarial Attacks. “r”
refers to reversible transformation, “i” refers to irreversible
transformation, and the number in front of them indicates
the number of such sub-models in the ensemble.
RD MV T2MV AVEP AVEL
Benign
14r 99.36% 99.70% 96.48% 99.68% 99.68%
14r+14i 99.27% 99.70% 98.46% 99.70% 99.70%
14r+28i 99.10% 99.70% 99.03% 99.70% 99.71%
14r+42i 99.38% 99.70% 99.16% 99.70% 99.70%
14r+56i 99.38% 99.70% 99.30% 99.69% 99.71%
14i 99.00% 99.66% 97.16% 99.68% 99.69%
28i 99.18% 99.70% 98.25% 99.68% 99.69%
42i 99.23% 99.69% 98.89% 99.68% 99.68%
56i 99.17% 99.70% 99.06% 99.71% 99.70%
FGSM
14r 58.68% 69.44% 66.84% 69.24% 68.52%
14r+14i 66.56% 73.59% 70.43% 72.85% 72.17%
14r+28i 64.82% 75.56% 72.60% 74.94% 73.69%
14r+42i 55.64% 75.26% 72.20% 74.32% 73.23%
14r+56i 57.26% 75.99% 72.94% 75.14% 73.71%
14i 66.64% 76.08% 72.18% 74.70% 73.31%
28i 67.78% 76.28% 74.09% 75.68% 74.42%
42i 61.28% 75.84% 72.00% 74.50% 72.29%
56i 59.71% 77.77% 75.78% 77.31% 75.56%
PGD
14r 34.26% 33.24% 34.84% 31.54% 30.62%
14r+14i 55.30% 42.36% 41.49% 41.71% 41.76%
14r+28i 39.51% 41.98% 41.26% 41.61% 42.59%
14r+42i 43.25% 43.57% 41.50% 43.31% 42.27%
14r+56i 33.42% 45.08% 41.80% 44.57% 43.58%
14i 36.68% 50.81% 46.44% 49.74% 46.84%
28i 42.56% 51.22% 46.64% 50.63% 48.44%
42i 37.14% 47.54% 43.22% 46.79% 44.84%
56i 43.60% 48.92% 43.62% 48.04% 45.15%
C&W
14r 97.00% 98.58% 92.82% 98.86% 98.82%
14r+14i 96.87% 99.18% 96.65% 99.26% 99.28%
14r+28i 97.20% 99.32% 97.38% 99.36% 99.40%
14r+42i 95.83% 99.37% 98.05% 99.38% 99.40%
14r+56i 97.97% 99.66% 97.76% 99.66% 99.66%
14i 97.78% 99.59% 94.68% 99.63% 99.58%
28i 82.78% 99.63% 96.15% 99.64% 99.65%
42i 96.92% 99.63% 97.41% 99.66% 99.65%
56i 98.01% 99.65% 97.94% 99.66% 99.65%
DeepFool
14r 97.90% 99.50% 92.30% 99.52% 99.62%
14r+14i 97.94% 99.66% 96.19% 99.67% 99.66%
14r+28i 98.36% 99.64% 97.40% 99.67% 99.67%
14r+42i 98.21% 99.65% 97.66% 99.66% 99.65%
14r+56i 96.37% 99.33% 98.17% 99.36% 99.39%
14i 97.18% 99.12% 93.68% 99.22% 99.22%
28i 96.37% 99.32% 96.84% 99.36% 99.40%
42i 96.96% 99.34% 97.48% 99.38% 99.37%
56i 96.26% 99.37% 97.60% 99.38% 99.36%
Table 7: Classification Accuracy of Ensembles on Fash-
ionMNIST with Different Sub-Models Under Adversarial
Attacks. “r” refers to reversible transformation, “i” refers
to irreversible transformation, and the number in front
of them indicates the number of such sub-models in the
ensemble.
RD MV T2MV AVEP AVEL
Benign
14r 90.66% 93.16% 86.90% 93.22% 93.56%
14r+14i 89.99% 93.13% 88.78% 93.20% 93.22%
14r+28i 90.24% 92.81% 89.22% 92.89% 92.74%
14r+42i 88.41% 92.82% 89.45% 92.88% 92.77%
14r+56i 89.23% 92.75% 89.60% 92.81% 92.79%
14i 90.21% 92.08% 85.06% 92.27% 92.09%
28i 87.75% 92.26% 87.04% 92.37% 92.22%
42i 89.40% 92.28% 88.33% 92.40% 92.34%
56i 90.32% 92.56% 88.56% 92.59% 92.54%
FGSM
14r 22.34% 24.42% 23.48% 24.44% 25.16%
14r+14i 20.43% 24.00% 22.64% 24.36% 24.74%
14r+28i 20.72% 25.49% 23.67% 25.60% 26.61%
14r+42i 23.02% 25.20% 23.33% 25.45% 26.56%
14r+56i 20.43% 25.54% 23.87% 25.85% 27.11%
14i 22.94% 23.55% 21.93% 23.85% 23.87%
28i 20.26% 25.49% 23.12% 25.87% 25.80%
42i 20.04% 24.82% 23.00% 25.20% 25.86%
56i 20.03% 24.19% 22.21% 24.33% 25.31%
PGD
14r 9.96% 9.20% 8.84% 9.62% 9.32%
14r+14i 15.12% 10.08% 9.18% 10.39% 11.73%
14r+28i 20.06% 10.72% 9.63% 11.12% 12.41%
14r+42i 14.03% 10.36% 9.30% 10.76% 12.28%
14r+56i 10.33% 10.68% 9.44% 11.00% 13.42%
14i 11.24% 11.94% 10.63% 12.61% 13.64%
28i 17.78% 11.51% 9.91% 11.94% 13.12%
42i 13.04% 12.63% 10.66% 12.92% 13.86%
56i 12.21% 10.77% 9.55% 11.05% 12.24%
C&W
14r 90.16% 92.82% 83.84% 93.02% 93.14%
14r+14i 85.72% 92.80% 86.41% 92.98% 92.80%
14r+28i 86.43% 92.80% 87.77% 92.95% 92.70%
14r+42i 87.22% 92.71% 88.08% 92.80% 92.66%
14r+56i 87.65% 92.51% 88.02% 92.61% 92.54%
14i 86.51% 91.55% 82.64% 91.74% 91.43%
28i 85.48% 91.96% 85.67% 92.04% 91.87%
42i 86.47% 92.17% 86.55% 92.24% 91.99%
56i 84.65% 92.01% 87.20% 92.15% 92.10%
DeepFool
14r 17.94% 18.60% 16.68% 18.63% 18.62%
14r+14i 88.66% 92.97% 85.52% 93.02% 93.05%
14r+28i 88.40% 92.59% 85.41% 92.81% 92.69%
14r+42i 87.92% 92.70% 86.42% 92.76% 92.68%
14r+56i 88.20% 92.36% 86.20% 92.46% 92.40%
14i 87.36% 91.49% 80.62% 91.68% 91.26%
28i 72.94% 92.01% 82.40% 92.12% 92.00%
42i 88.21% 92.14% 85.92% 92.29% 92.22%
56i 87.34% 91.76% 84.03% 91.88% 91.96%
